Jaz Services

ASSESSMENTS

Communication of order (RCW 51.48.120)

RCW 51.48.120 requires that service of a Notice of Assessment by mail be confirmed. If the USPS return receipt shows the Notice of Assessment was unclaimed, service of the Notice of Assessment is not confirmed and service by mail fails.In re Jaz Services, BIIA Dec., 13 11377 (2015) [Editor's Note: Overruled by Simmons v. Department of Labor & Indus., No. 84529-I (slip opinion filed October 30, 2023), in which the court held that where the Department mailed a notice of assessment to a sole-proprietor employer's last known address by certified mail with return receipt requested, the Department complied with RCW 51.48.120, and the 30-day clock to protest or appeal began to run regardless of the fact that the owner of the sole proprietorship was out of town and didn't actually receive the notice of assessment. RCW 51.48.120 doesn't require actual receipt by the employer).

Scroll down for order.

BEFORE THE BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN RE: JAZ SERVICES LLC)	DOCKET NO. 13 11377
)	
)	ORDER VACATING PROPOSED DECISION
)	AND ORDER AND REMANDING THE APPEAL
FIRM NO. 925.776-01)	FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

Firm, Jaz Services, LLC, by Law Offices of Martin Silver, P.S., per Martin Silver

Department of Labor and Industries, per Jerry Billings, Litigation Specialist, and by The Office of the Attorney General, per Scott T. Middleton

Michael Daniels and Patricia Daniels filed an appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals on February 4, 2013, from a Department of Labor and Industries Order and Notice Reconsidering Notice and Order of Assessment of Workers Compensation Taxes dated December 14, 2012. In this order, the Department affirmed its Notice and Order of Assessment of Corporate Officer Liability dated August 21, 2012, in which the Department assessed personally Michael Daniels and Patricia Daniels, and their marital community, \$807,155.63 for the unpaid taxes, penalties and interest that had accrued and were unpaid by the LLC, Jaz Services. The appeal is **REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS**.

PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

As provided by RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision. The Department filed a timely Petition for Review of a Proposed Decision and Order issued on November 17, 2014, in which the industrial appeals judge reversed and remanded the Department order dated December 14, 2012. On February 26, 2015, the firm filed a Reply to the Petition for Review.

On June 6, 2013, the industrial appeals judge held a hearing on timeliness of the appeal that Michael Daniels filed on his and Patricia Daniels' behalf. On September 6, 2013, the industrial appeals judge issued an Interlocutory Order Finding a Timely Appeal. We agree with the timeliness determination of the industrial appeals judge.

Following issuance of the Interlocutory Order, a hearing was set for presentation of evidence on the appeal by Michael Daniels and Patricia Daniels (the Daniels) and the Department of Labor

and Industries. Before the hearing was held, the Daniels filed Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Department filed its Opposition to the Daniels' Motion for Summary Judgment. After briefing and a hearing on the motion, the industrial appeals judge issued the Proposed Decision and Order in which she granted the Daniels' motion for summary judgment; reversed the appealed order; and determined that the Daniels are not personally liable for the unpaid premiums of Jaz Services, LLC.

The Board has reviewed the evidentiary rulings in the record of proceedings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are affirmed.

DECISION

In this appeal Michael Daniels and Patricia Daniels contest the Department of Labor and Industries' determination they are personally liable for the unpaid assessments of premiums and penalties of Jaz Services, a limited liability corporation in which they were principals and that was dissolved by the Secretary of State.

Summary Judgment under Civil Rule 56 is appropriate only if there are no material facts. and given the facts, the Daniels' should be granted relief from the appealed order. CR 56 permits the court to pierce the formal allegations of fact in pleadings and grant relief by summary judgment when determined by uncontroverted facts in affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories, there are no genuine issues of material fact. A material fact is one on which the outcome depends in whole or in part. The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to show there is no issue of material fact. All reasonable inferences must be resolved against the moving party, and the motion should be granted only if reasonable people could reach but one conclusion.¹

The industrial appeals judge determined the Daniels' appeal was timely based on an actual hearing on this issue. The industrial appeals judge granted the Daniels relief from personal liability by way of summary judgment. We discuss both here.

Appeal Timeliness. We agree with the industrial appeals judge's determination that the Daniels' appeal was timely filed. The Department directed its Order and Notice Reconsidering Notice and Order of Assessment of Workers Compensation Taxes dated December 14, 2012, to the Daniels by certified mail via the US Postal Service (USPS). The Daniels reside at the same Woodinville address used by the Department in its mailing. Mr. Daniels testified that they receive

¹ See, *In re David Potts*, BIIA Dec., 88 3822 (1989)

their mail in "just one of ten mail boxes up the street and it's picked up and dived (*sic*) accordingly personal and business." Mail is picked up by Mr. Daniels, his wife, and two teenage children. Mr. Daniels testified that he did not receive the Order and Notice until it was personally served on him on January 9, 2013, and that he timely filed his appeal within thirty days on February 4, 2013.

Jerold Billings, a Litigation Specialist with the Department, explained the Department's practice of mailing by certified mail, then receiving USPS return receipts. Handwritten notes on a return receipt indicate the dates USPS placed notice of the held mail in the mailbox of the intended recipient. If the Department receives an indication that certified mail has been unclaimed or the party has moved, the Department may try several measures such as remailing to a corrected address or, as in the Daniels' case, personal service.

The USPS return receipts related to the December 14, 2012 Order sent by certified mail on December 28, 2012, was unclaimed. The receipts show notifications to the intended recipient of December 29, 2012, January 15, 2013, and January 30, 2013. Exhibit No. 3; 6/6/13 Tr. at 24-35.

There is no dispute over the fact that the December 14, 2012 order was not delivered to and left at the Daniels' residence by the USPS. And, there is no dispute over the fact that the Daniels did not receive the December 14, 2012 order until Mr. Daniels received it by personal service on January 9, 2013. Mr. Daniels electronically filed his appeal on February 4, 2013.

The Department may avail itself of alternative means to serve a written notice of assessment on an employer: service by mailing by a method for which "receipt can be confirmed or tracked to the employer's last known address or served in the manner prescribed for the service of summons in a civil action." A notice of assessment becomes final thirty days from "the date the notice of assessment was served" unless a written request for reconsideration is filed with the Department or an appeal is filed with the Board.⁴

The Department contends that the thirty days within which the Daniels must have appealed should be counted from the date of mailing by certified mail, December 28, 2012, and contends the Daniels' appeal over thirty days later on February 4, 2013, is untimely. We disagree with the Department's contention. We agree with the industrial appeals judge's determination that the thirty-day appeal period ran upon the date Mr. Daniels received the assessment, January 9, 2013, and his appeal within thirty days on February 4, 3013, is timely. The Department's argument fails to

³ RCW 51.48.120

² 6/6/13 Tr. at 6.

⁴ RCW.51.48.131.

distinguish between the statutory provisions for optional **means** of service and **actual** service. The means initially utilized by the Department, certified mail, was permitted, but failed. The assessment was not left for the Daniels to view. The statute, in allowing for certified mail, contemplates that "receipt be confirmed.⁵ Receipt by Daniels was not confirmed until successful personal service on January 9, 2013. The appeal is timely.

The Daniels' Substantive Defense. The Department's authority for personal liability assessments is contained in RCW 51.48.055. In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Daniels seek to rely on subsection (4) of this statute: "The officer, member, manager, or other person is not liable if all of the assets of the corporation or Limited Liability Company have been applied to its debts through bankruptcy or receivership."

To support their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Daniels presented evidence that Jaz Services filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy through Mr. Daniels on February 7, 2013, listing assets of \$100. And the Daniels presented evidence that the bankruptcy court at the outset indicated that creditors should not proceed with proof of claims unless they were further notified to provide such. Eventually the court closed the bankruptcy case with an indication there were no assets to distribute.

We reject the Daniels' reliance on the bankruptcy defense allowed in RCW 51.48.055 (4) because their Chapter 7 filing did not occur until after the Department issued its orders that are the subject of this appeal. The Board must determine whether an appealed Department order was correct as of the time the Department issued its order and not as of some later date. The term *nunc pro tunc*⁶ commonly refers to whether a court should, based on new facts, change its prior order issued before new material facts came into existence. The Daniels ask this Board to direct the Department to change its personal liability assessment against them based on material facts, the fact of bankruptcy, that exist now but that did not exist when the Department issued its personal liability assessment against them. This would require the exercise of equitable powers this Board lacks.⁷

We find this appeal timely, but we deny the Daniels' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Proposed Decision and Order of November 17, 2014, is vacated. This order vacating is not a final Decision and Order of the Board within the meaning of RCW 51.52.110.

⁵ RCW 51.48.120

⁶ Latin, literally meaning "now for then."

⁷ See *In re Johanna Hoerner, Dec'd*, BIIA Dec., (1986).

We note there may be issues raised as contested in future proceedings not yet identified and on which no evidence has been provided. These are such as control or supervision and willful failure to pay, as referenced in subsections (1) and (2) of the governing statute; whether the personal liability assessment was accurate in amount in light of subsection (2); and, whether either of the Daniels was a mandatorily covered person directed not to pay as referenced in subsection (3) of the statute. We express no view or inclination regarding the existence of any or whether they warrant presentation of evidence and/or briefing. There may be issues other than these and we have referenced these solely to underscore our obligation to provide opportunity for further hearing.

This appeal is remanded to the hearings process as provided by WAC 263-12-145(4), for further proceedings as indicated by this order. Unless the matter is settled or dismissed, the industrial appeals judge will issue a new Proposed Decision and Order. The new order will contain findings and conclusions on each contested issue of fact and law. Any party aggrieved by the new Proposed Decision and Order may petition the Board for review, as provided by RCW 51.52.104.

Dated: April 9, 2015.

/s/ DAVID E. THREEDY	Chairperson
/s/	
FRANK E. FENNERTY, JR.	Member
/s/	
JACK S. ENG	Member

BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS