

1 A prima facie case means that a party must present substantial evidence that, if unrebutted or
2 uncontradicted, would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the issues on appeal.³
3 Another definition for prima facie case is one that "will prevail until contradicted and overcome by
4 other evidence."⁴ A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to meet this burden.⁵ In deciding whether
5 to grant the CR 41(b)(3) motion to dismiss, we are required to accept the DOE's evidence as true;
6 view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the employer; and determine if there is any
7 evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence establishing a prima facie case.

8 Here, James M. Haynes, M.D., testified that myasthenia gravis is "best thought of as genetic
9 in origin" and that it was "highly unlikely and even less likely than that" that Ms. Valero's condition
10 was related to her employment at the Hanford site. In explaining his opinion, Dr. Haynes testified
11 that he's "never heard of such a thing" and that he's never encountered an allegation of an
12 environmental cause in the "literature."⁶ Additionally, Lawrence C. Yearsley testified that because
13 Ms. Valero's work at the Hanford site was administrative in nature, she would not have been close to
14 any source of radiological exposure. In support of this conclusion, Mr. Yearsley pointed to
15 Ms. Valero's lifetime dosimetry record, which he believed showed that she was well below what a
16 regulatory occupational exposure level of radiation would be for any sort of occupation. He explained
17 that in reviewing the records of her exposure, he found that her lifetime exposure would not have
18 exceeded just one year's worth of exposure allowance. In Mr. Yearsley's opinion, there was no
19 difference between Ms. Valero's safety working as an administrative worker at the Hanford site
20 versus working in an administrative building at the Federal Building in Richland.

21 Accepting the opinions of Dr. Haynes and Mr. Yearsley as true, and viewing the light most
22 favorable to the DOE, their collective testimonies meet the minimum threshold of establishing a prima
23 facie case that Ms. Valero's myasthenia gravis did not arise naturally and proximately from her work
24 at the Hanford site between 1978 and 2002. Accordingly, Ms. Valero and the Department must
25 present their evidence in support of claim allowance under RCW 51.32.187.

26 Finally, we want to address the argument put forward by Ms. Valero and the Department that
27 the employer needed to present clear and convincing evidence in order to establish a prima facie
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30 ³ *In re William Morgan*, Dckt. No. 91 3417 (January 14, 1993).

31 ⁴ *Black's Law Dictionary*, 1189 (6th ed. 1990).

32 ⁵ *In re Peter Kim*, BIIA Dec. 00 21147 at 2 (2002) citing *Omeitt v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 21 Wn.2d 684 (1944).

⁶ Haynes Dep. at 25-26.

1 case. They rely on *Spivey v. City of Bellevue*,⁷ as controlling when deciding if the DOE has met its
2 burden. *Spivey* involved two appeals brought under a similar statute, RCW 51.32.185, which
3 provided for a legal presumption that occupational disease claims brought by firefighters for
4 melanoma should be allowed unless the employer could show, based on a preponderance of the
5 evidence, that the condition was not occupationally related. Notably, in *Spivey*, both of the underlying
6 cases being appealed involved situations where the claim had been fully litigated; that is, both the
7 employer and the worker had put on evidence in support of their respective positions. The *Spivey*
8 court was asked to determine what effect the statutory presumption had when evaluating the totality
9 of the evidence, not what evidence was necessary for the employer to make a prima facie case in
10 light of the statutory presumption. Because this appeal has not been fully litigated, we do not find
11 *Spivey* to be controlling.

12 **ORDER**

13 This appeal is remanded to the hearings process, as provided by WAC 263-12-145(5), for
14 further proceedings as indicated by this order. Unless the matter is settled or dismissed, the industrial
15 appeals judge will issue a new Proposed Decision and Order. The new order will contain findings
16 and conclusions as to each contested issue of fact and law. Any party aggrieved by the new
17 Proposed Decision and Order may petition the Board for review, as provided by RCW 51.52.104.
18 This order vacating is not a final Decision and Order of the Board within the meaning of
19 RCW 51.52.110.

20 Dated: August 13, 2021.

21 BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS

22 
23 LINDA L. WILLIAMS, Chairperson

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25 JACK S. ENG, Member
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31 _____
32 ⁷ 187 Wn.2d 716 (2017).

**Addendum to Order
In re Dora E. Valero
Docket No. 19 19528
Claim No. SL-21080**

Appearances

Claimant, Dora E. Valero, by Smart Law Offices, per Christopher L. Childers
Self-Insured Employer, U.S. Department of Energy, by Wallace Klor Mann Capener & Bishop,
P.C., per Lawrence E. Mann
Department of Labor and Industries, by Office of the Attorney General, per Bryan M. S. Ovens

Department Order(s) Under Appeal

In Docket No. 19 19528, the employer, U.S. Department of Energy, filed an appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals on September 3, 2019, from an order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated July 5, 2019. In this order, the Department affirmed as correct its previous order dated April 1, 2019, which allowed Ms. Valero’s claim as an occupational disease pursuant to the Hanford presumption under RCW 51.32.187, with a date of manifestation determined to be July 13, 2018.

Petition for Review

As provided by RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision. The employer filed a timely petition for review of Proposed Decision and Order issued on December 31, 2020. On April 2, 2021, both Ms. Valero and the Department filed their respective responses to the Department of Energy's Petition for Review.