

Applegate, Lyle

BOARD

Equitable powers

Under the principle of stare decisis, we have previously stated that we will grant equitable relief in cases with such similar facts as to be almost identical to cases that have been passed upon by appellate courts. While we continue to honor stare decisis, we will grant equitable relief where the circumstances are appropriate and within those situations and guidelines set out by our courts; honoring stare decisis does not require we only apply the doctrine in cases with such similar facts as to be almost identical. In doing so, we are not creating equitable remedies, but granting them where our courts have determined them applicable.*In re Lyle Applegate, Order Vacating Proposed Decision and Order, BIIA Dec., 18 16730 (2019)*

Scroll down for order.

1 the second order without statutory authority, such as if a protest was filed by Mr. Applegate, his
2 medical provider, or some other interested party. In discovery, the Department admitted that it
3 "sometimes" receives protests from workers that the workers fail to send to the employer.

4 In reliance on the Department's second order, CenturyLink did not file a request for
5 reconsideration or appeal of the Department's first order within 60 days of the date that order was
6 communicated to it. Instead, CenturyLink filed an appeal to the Department's second order on
7 June 12, 2018, within 60 days of the date that order was communicated to it. After it appealed the
8 Department's second order, in formal discovery before the Board, CenturyLink learned for the first
9 time that the Department had construed CenturyLink's counsel's notice of appearance as a protest
10 to the first order, and that it had done so "mistakenly."

11 **2. The Department lacked authority to issue the order dated April 18, 2018, and the order**
12 **is incorrect as a matter of law.**

13 In law, without any consideration of equity, our industrial appeals judge properly analyzed this
14 appeal and correctly concluded that CenturyLink in effect appealed an order that was incorrect as a
15 matter of law and the order it purported to affirm had become final and binding. He concluded we
16 have no authority to consider the merits of the February 22, 2018 or April 18, 2018 orders.

17 The analysis can be summarized as follows: CenturyLink's counsel's notice of appearance
18 cannot reasonably be construed as a challenge to the Department's February 22, 2018 order; it was
19 only a notice of appearance and it said nothing about challenging any order of the Department.¹
20 Because the Department received no valid protest to, or appeal of, the February 22, 2018 order it
21 became final and binding under the law. And because no protest of the February 22, 2018 order was
22 received before the Department issued its April 18, 2018 adherence order, the latter order was issued
23 without statutory authority and must be vacated.

24 CenturyLink's citation to *Marley*² in support of a contrary conclusion regarding the
25 Department's authority to issue the April 18, 2018 order is misplaced. *Marley* makes clear that the
26 Department had **jurisdiction** to issue its April 18, 2018 order, and that **if** the employer had not
27 appealed it, it would have become final and binding. But because the order was appealed and was
28
29
30

31 ¹ *Boyd v. City of Olympia*, 1 Wn. App. 2d 17, 30 (2017).

32 ² *Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 125 Wn.2d 533 (1994).

1 issued without statutory authority, we have no choice but to vacate it based on the applicable statutes
2 and our prior decisions.³

3 **3. CenturyLink is Entitled to Equitable Relief**

4 CenturyLink contends that it is entitled to be equitably relieved from its late filing of its appeal
5 to the Department's February 22, 2018 order. The Department counters that the employer has not
6 shown its right to equitable relief, arguing among other points that we lack a stare decisis basis to
7 grant such relief.

8 Our courts have designed equitable doctrines "to relieve certain parties under special
9 circumstances from the harshness of strict legal rules,"⁴ and have recognized "a very narrow
10 equitable power . . . apart from the provisions of Title 51 RCW, to set aside actions of the
11 Department."⁵ In turn, we have recognized that we have jurisdiction to rule on claims based in equity.⁶
12 We have an obligation to admit evidence relevant to such claims and to make findings and
13 conclusions attendant thereto.⁷

14 The Board's powers are limited to those the legislature has granted it. The legislative grant of
15 authority does not include the exercise of broad equitable powers.⁸ For nearly 40 years however,
16 under the principle of stare decisis, we have stated that we will grant equitable relief in cases *factually*
17 *similar* to cases that have been passed upon by courts of final jurisdiction. Our Supreme Court has
18 defined stare decisis in ways that support application to those situations with identical or similar facts⁹
19 and also describes stare decisis as "the doctrine of precedent, generally dictates that a court follow
20 earlier judicial decisions when the same points of law arise again in litigation."¹⁰ In certain
21 circumstances we relied on stare decisis to apply equitable principles because, "Under those
22 circumstances, the Board can say with reasonable certainty that failure to apply equity at this level
23 would only result in its application at a higher level."¹¹ We declined to use stare decisis in cases in
24 which we believed the facts were sufficiently dissimilar that we should not use principles of equity to
25

26
27 ³ RCW 51.52.050; RCW 51.52.060; *In re Richard Wagner*, BIIA Dec., 88 0962 (1988); *In re Gregory L. Watson*, Dckt. No.
16 15362 (March 13, 2017).

28 ⁴ *Hyatt v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 132 Wn. App. 387, 398 (2006).

29 ⁵ *Kingery v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 132 Wn.2d 162, 173 (1997).

30 ⁶ *In re William H. Place*, Dckt. No. 96 3023 (October 14, 1997).

31 ⁷ *Place*, at 2.

32 ⁸ *In re State Roofing & Insulation, Inc.*, BIIA Dec., 89 1770 (1991).

⁹ *Floyd v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 44 Wn.2d 560, 565 (1954).

¹⁰ *Roberson v. Perez*, 156 Wn.2d 33, 41 (2005) (citations omitted).

¹¹ *In re William H. Pingree*, Dckt. No. 91 0116 (May 19, 1992).

1 resolve an appeal.¹² In other circumstances we will view the facts as sufficiently similar to appellate
2 cases so that we can apply equitable principles to resolve the appeal.¹³ The definitions of stare
3 decisis acknowledged by the Supreme Court do not require we only apply the doctrine in cases with
4 such similar facts as to be almost identical. We are able to apply equity if the facts allow us to apply
5 equitable principles consistent with application of the principles by our appellate courts. We are fully
6 capable of granting equitable relief within the guidelines set by our courts when we are confident that
7 the courts would grant the same relief—without needing the facts before us to be nearly identical to
8 those in a published court decision. We continue to honor stare decisis; we will grant equitable relief
9 "where the circumstances are appropriate and within those situations and guidelines set out by our
10 courts."¹⁴ This standard ensures that we are not creating equitable remedies, but granting them
11 where our courts have determined them applicable.

12 In the circumstances provided by this appeal, we believe CenturyLink is entitled to relief from
13 the finality of the February 22, 2018 order based on the application of equitable estoppel. Equitable
14 estoppel prevents a party from taking a position inconsistent with a previous one where inequitable
15 consequences would result to a party who has justifiably and in good faith relied on the earlier
16 position.¹⁵ Our courts have implied that if all of the doctrine's elements have been established, the
17 Department can be estopped from contending a party has untimely appealed its order in an industrial
18 insurance case.¹⁶

19 When equitable estoppel is asserted against the government, the party asserting estoppel
20 must establish five elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: (1) a statement, admission,
21 or act by the party to be estopped, which is inconsistent with its later claims, (2) the asserting party
22 acted in reliance upon the statement or action, (3) injury would result to the asserting party if the other
23 party were allowed to repudiate its prior statement or action, (4) estoppel is necessary to prevent a
24 manifest injustice, and (5) estoppel will not impair governmental functions.¹⁷ Our industrial appeals
25 judge suggested that CenturyLink could only show "injury" by proving that Mr. Applegate's
26 occupational disease claim is not valid. The law does not appear to support the contention. For
27

28 ¹² *In re James Neff*, BIIA Dec., 92 2782 (1994); *In re Isaias Chavez, Dec'd*, BIIA Dec., 85 2867 (1987), *In re Ronald*
29 *Jamieson*, BIIA Dec., 62,551 (1983);

30 ¹³ *In re Seth Jackson*, BIIA Dec., 61,088 (1982); *State Roofing*.

31 ¹⁴ *State Roofing*, at 7.

32 ¹⁵ *Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.*, 159 Wn.2d 868, 887 (2007).

¹⁶ *Hyatt*, at 398.

¹⁷ *Silverstreak*, at 887.

1 estoppel purposes, a party has been injured if it detrimentally changed its position in reasonable
2 reliance on the government's act;¹⁸ CenturyLink's loss of its right to appeal appears to qualify as such
3 an injury.¹⁹

4 We conclude the Department is equitably estopped from contending CenturyLink's appeal of
5 the allowance order is not timely. CenturyLink has established each of the doctrine's elements by
6 clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In its April 18, 2018 order, the Department expressly advised
7 the parties that they had 60 days from the date they received the order to appeal it. Its terms, by
8 implication, advised them that the Department's February 22, 2018 order was no longer its final order
9 on the issue of claim allowance, and that no party had an obligation, or even a right, to appeal the
10 February 22, 2018 order. In reliance on the Department's April 18, 2018 order, CenturyLink did not
11 file a timely appeal to the Department's February 22, 2018 order and instead filed a timely appeal to
12 the Department's April 18, 2018 order.

13 Our industrial appeals judge suggested that CenturyLink's reliance on the Department's
14 April 18, 2018 affirming order was not reasonable because it "should have known" that the
15 Department issued it without a valid intervening protest. We cannot agree. The suggestion would
16 mean that a party has a duty to investigate the Department's underlying authority to issue a facially
17 valid order in some time frame less than the 60 days set forth in RCW 51.52.050 and RCW 51.52.060
18 or potentially lose its right to challenge the order. Here, to preserve its appeal rights, it turns out
19 CenturyLink would have had to start its investigation, complete it, and then act on its results, **all**
20 **within about five business days**. We are aware of no law that suggests claimants and employers
21 possess such an unreasonable duty. Moreover, the existence of such a duty is contrary to the
22 statutorily mandated 60 days.

23 If the equitable estoppel is not applied, CenturyLink will suffer injury in having lost its right to
24 appeal the order allowing the claim. Manifest injustice will result. No evidence has been presented
25 suggesting the exercise of governmental functions will be impaired by the application of estoppel in
26 the circumstance of this claim.

27 **4. Conclusion**

28 In contravention of clearly established law, on facts known only to it, the Department issued
29 an unauthorized order affirming claim allowance and setting forth false information about the parties'
30

31 ¹⁸ *Kramarevcky v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.*, 122 Wn.2d 738, 747 (1993).

32 ¹⁹ *In re Robert E Ohman*, Dckt. No. 17 15999 (May 7, 2018).

1 appeal rights. The Department is equitably estopped from asserting the decision to allow the claim
2 is final and binding. This appeal is remanded for a hearing on the merits of the February 22, 2018
3 order.

4 **ORDER**

5 The April 25, 2019 Proposed Decision and Order is vacated. This order vacating is not a final
6 Decision and Order of the Board within the meaning of RCW 51.52.110.

7 This appeal is remanded to the hearings process, as provided by WAC 263-12-145(5), for
8 further proceedings as indicated by this order. Unless the matter is settled or dismissed, the industrial
9 appeals judge will issue a new Proposed Decision and Order. The new order will contain findings
10 and conclusions as to each contested issue of fact and law. Any party aggrieved by the new
11 Proposed Decision and Order may petition the Board for review, as provided by RCW 51.52.104.

12 Dated: September 13, 2019.

13 BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS

14 

15 LINDA L. WILLIAMS, Chairperson

16 

17 ISABELA. M. COLE, Member

18 

19 JACK S. ENG, Member

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

**Addendum to Order
In re Lyle R. Applegate
Docket No. 18 16730
Claim No. SJ-90338**

10
11
12
13

Appearances

Claimant, Lyle R. Applegate, by Meyer Thorp Attorneys at Law, PLLC, per Rondi J. Thorp
Self-Insured Employer, Qwest Corporation dba CenturyLink, by Reinisch Wilson Weier, P.C.,
per Shawna G. Fruin

Department of Labor and Industries, by Office of the Attorney General, per Kevin C. Elliott

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Department Order Under Appeal

In Docket No. 18 16730, the employer, Qwest Corporation dba CenturyLink, filed an appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals on June 12, 2018, from an order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated February 22, 2018. In this order, the Department allowed Mr. Applegate's claim for occupational hearing loss and closed the claim with no permanent partial disability award.

Petition for Review

As provided by RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision. The employer filed a timely Petition for Review of a Proposed Decision and Order issued on April 26, 2019, in which the industrial appeals judge dismissed the appeal based on the employer's failure to file the appeal within the time allowed by RCW 51.52.060.